State of Utah v. Richard S. : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
State of Utah v. Richard S. : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jane A. Marquardt; Attorney for Appellant;
Robert B. Hansen; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Richard S., No. 16219 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1575
~-
' 
JANE A. MARQUARDT 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
~ttorney for Appellant 
385 - 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
_...---·-· --
c.YT·- ;:; .. -.. : -:l '-·~ _ .... ..} ..... • 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF UTAH, in the 
interest 
Of 
RICHARDs., a person under 
eighteen years of age. 
CASE No. 16219 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a dispositional order of Judge L. 
Roland Anderson of the First Judicial District Juvenile 
Court for Weber County, State of Utah. 
JANE A. MARQUARDT 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorney for Appellant 
385 - 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Utah Attorney General 
SHARON PEACOCK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Paqe 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE ------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------ 3 
AGRUMENT 
THE JUVENILE COURT DID HAVE JURISDICTION 
TO CONDUCT A RESTITUTION HEARING AND MAKE 
AN ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 
RESTITUTION --------------------------------- 3 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------- 10 
CASES CITED 
In the Matter of A N , 500 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. App. 1973)- 8 
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County, Etc., 572. P.2d 
451 (Ariz. App. 1977) ------------------------------- 8 
R. v. Whitmer, 515 P.2d 617 (Utah 1973) ---------------- 3 
State of Missouri ex re1 B C C v. Conley, 568 S.W.2d 
608 (Mo. 1978)--------------------------------------- 7,8 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-402(2)---------------- 3 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-39 
------------------
5,6,8,9 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-40 
------------------
4 
(i) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF UTAH, in the 
interest of 
RICHARD S., Case No. 16219 
a person under eighteen 
years of age. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant has appealed from an Order entered on 
December 12, 1978, by JudgeL. Roland Anderson, First Judicial 
District Court for Weber County, which required appellant 
to pay restitution for damage to five motor homes. (R. 17). 
Appellant admitted to damaging one motor horne. All charges 
concerning any other motor homes were dismissed by the Juvenile 
Court. (R. 16). 
DISPOSITION IN LOl'lER COURT 
On Septe~~er 20, 1978, appellant appeared before the 
Juvenile Court and entered a plea of true to the petition 
charging him with unlawfully entering one motor horne with 
intent to commit a felony or theft. (TR. 1 ) . The court 
recommitted the juvenile to the State Youth Development 
Center (R.4). In the same order the time for a determination 
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on restitution was set for October 11, 1978, (R. 4). 
On October 16, 1978, a second petition was filed 
charging appellant with four additional counts of damaging 
motor homes (R. 6). Said offenses were committed at the same 
place, time, and date as the original offense which appellant 
admitted. Appellant denied the additional charges and trial 
was set for November 21, 1978. On that date the court granted 
appellant's Motion to Dismiss all four charges. (R. 12). On 
November 21, 1978, and DP.cember 12, 1978, a restitution hearing 
was held at which the court ruled that appellant could be 
ordered to make restitution for damages to all five motor homes, 
although he had admitted to damaging only one and all other 
charges were dismissed. An order to that effect, plus a 
recommendation to the Youth Development Center that said 
restitution be paid as part of parole from the YDC, was 
entered on December 12, 1978. (Legal File 17). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Juvenile Court's 
order that he pay restitution for damages to all five motor 
homes and also that the Court nullify the Juvenile Court's 
recommendation that restitution be made a condition of his 
parole from the Youth Development Center. Respondent asks 
that the case be remanded for findings as to the amount of 
damages to the one vehicle which appellant admitted damaging 
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and for affirmance of the Juvenile Court's recommendation that 
restitution in a modified amount be made a condition of parole. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with appellant's Statement of Facts 
with the following exceptions: 
1. On page 5 of Appellant's Brief he somewhat mis-
characterizes the statements of the county attorney regarding 
the single criminal episode statute (U.C.A. §76-1-402(2)). 
Mr. Gladwell did not admit that the instant situation was the 
type contemplated by the statute, but rather that the adult 
criminal code has never been adopted as part of the Juvenile 
Court procedure and is not binding in determining whether a 
juvenile is delinquent. (TR. 15). Nonetheless, the court 
did dismiss the charges. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Respondent does not contest appellant's arguments 
in Points I and II of his brief, pp. 7-12. 
II. THE JUVENILE COURT DID HAVE JURISDICTION 
TO CONDUCT A RESTITUTION HEARING AND MAKE 
AN ORDER AND REC011MENDATION REGARDING 
RESTITUTION. 
It is true, as appellant states in Point III of his 
brief, that the Juvenile Court is a statutory court of limited 
jurisdiction. This court said in R. v. 1'7hitrner, 515 P.2d 617 
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(Utah 1973) that the Juvenile Court has only those powers 
which are specifically granted by the Juvenile Court Act. 
Appellant suggests that the Juvenile Court did not 
have jurisdiction to entertain the issue of restitution after 
he had already been recommitted to the Youth Development 
Center. This argument is based upon the language of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-la-40 which states in part: 
The continuing jurisdiction of the court 
shall terminate (1) upon order of the court, 
(2) upon commitment to the state industrial 
school for an indeterminate period in excess 
of 90 days, and (3) upon commencement of pro-
ceedings in adult cases under section 78-la-19. 
The continuing jurisdiction of the court is not 
terminated by marriage. (Emphasis added.) 
The purpose for the provisions of this statute termin-
ating Juvenile Court jurisdiction upon commitment to the Youth 
Development Center is only to allow the Youth Development 
Center officials to administer their own programs and to make 
necessary decisions regarding the youth and his treatment 
plan. The Youth Development Center has sole control over the 
juvenile and his activities, his release and parole, after 
the court has committed him, and the Youth Development Center 
officials need not report back to the Juvenile Court. This 
was the clear intent and purpose of Utah Code Annotated, section 
78-la-40, quoted above. It was not intended to prohibit the 
Juvenile Court from co~pleting a proceeding it had already 
commenced against a particular juvenile. 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the present case, there is no question but that 
the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction to hold a restitution 
hearing and to make an order regarding restitution even after 
the appellant had been recommitted to the Youth Development 
Center. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-Ja-39, which enumerates 
the various dispositions the Juvenile Court may make after an 
adjudication of delinquency, provides that: 
"* * * (4) The court may commit the child to 
the state youth development center or other 
similar institution that may be available •••• " 
It also provides that: 
"(7) The court may order that the child be 
required to repair or replace or to otherwise 
make restitution for damage or loss caused by 
his wrongful act, and may impose fines in limited 
amounts." 
And further, the statute provides that: 
"(17) The court may make any other reasonable 
orders which are for the best interest of the 
child or are required for the protection of the 
public, except that no person under the age of 
eighteen may be committed to jail or prison. 
The court may combine several of the above-listed 
modes of disposition where they are compat~ble." 
The order by which appellant was recommitted to the 
Youth Development Center (R.4} also included an order that 
restitution would be determined at a later date. According 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-39, the court does have 
the authority both to commit a youth to the Youth Development 
center and to provide for restitution. Where appropriate, 
-5-
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several modes of disposition can be combined, Section 78-3a-39 
(17). That is precisely what happened in this case. The 
same order combined the commitment to the Youth Development 
Center and a provision for restitution to be set. Surely by 
doing one, the Juvenile Court does not divest itself of the 
jurisdiction to do the other. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-39(17) states 
that any reasonable order necessary to protect the public 
may be made. In this case, restitution was necessary to even 
partially compensate the victim of appellant's acts for the 
damages he suffered. On September 20, 1978, when the order 
recommitting appellant to the Youth Development Center was 
made (R. 4) ,.it was determined at the same time that restitution 
should be made. (TR. 2). However, on that particular date 
it was impossible for the court to determine what the amount 
of restitution should be. (TR. 2,3). Therefore, the court 
left that matter open and scheduled a later hearing only for 
the purpose of determining the amount of restitution. (TR. 3). 
As the Juvenile Court said at the later hearing, because the 
matter was commenced before the commitment to the Youth 
Development Center and was only continued for the determination 
of amount of restitution, the court retained its authority to 
order restitution. (TR. 7,8). 
The unusual circumstances of appellant's commitment 
to the Youth Development Center should also be considered b"' 
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this court. At the time of the occurrence at issue here, the 
appellant had already been committed to the Youth Development 
Center for other offenses. He was home either on an extended 
home visit (TR. 1) or AWOL (TR. 4), when he was involved in 
the incident at Freeway Mazda. He was returned to the Youth 
Development Center by a police officer who arrested him on the 
night of the break-ins. (TR. 4). Appellant ran away from the 
Youth Development Center the same night, in fact "before the 
police officer hardly even got off the grounds." (TR. 4). 
About two weeks later, he returned on his own to the Youth 
Development Center and was there at the time the delinquency 
hearing was held on September 20, 1978. (TR. 1). The order 
recommitting appellant to the Youth Development Center merely 
confirmed and approved the status quo. In fact, the recommitment 
order was made effective ~pro tunc to September 4, which 
was the date appellant voluntarily returned to the Youth 
Development Center. 
It would by highly inequitable to allow the unusual 
nature of his commitment and presence at the Youth Development 
Center to relieve appellant of his responsibility to make 
restitution to the victim of his acts. The Juvenile Court 
had the jurisdiction, the authority, and the public duty to 
order restitution in this case. 
In his brief, page 14, appellant cites State of 
Missouri ex rel B C C v. Conley, 568 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1978), 
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which discusses a Missouri statute similar to Utah's which 
terminates Juve·nile Court jurisdiction upon commitment to the 
state training school. In that case, the Missouri court said: 
Once a juvenile is committed to and received 
by the division of youth services for intern-
ment in the state training school for boys at 
Boonville, the committing juvenile court loses 
jurisdiction over the juvenile unless jurisdiction 
is returned to it in an aperopriate proceeding. 
S68 S.W.2d at 608. (Emphas~s added}. 
In the present case, the restitution hearing was clearly 
an "appropriate proceeding" to return jurisdiction to the Juvenile 
Court as the court is specifically authorized by statute to 
order restitution from an adjudicated delinquent, Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-Ja-39(17). The restitution hearing was 
necessary to enable the court to make a proper order, and was 
thus an appropriate proceeding over which to exercise jurisdiction. 
The facts of the Conley case, supra, are not even 
remotely similar to those of the instant situation, and the 
jurisdictional statute is only mentioned in passing as the 
Missouri court discussed the issue of whether a juvenile 
should be allowed to have his case heard before a different 
judge. The case is certainly not very helpful in the context 
of the present case. 
Likewise, the other two cases cited by appellant, 
In the !-'latter of A N , 500 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. App. 1973), and 
~~~~~~=-~~==~=== 
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County, Etc., 572 P.2d 451 (Ariz. 
App. 1977), do not support the conclusion urged by appellant. 
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(See Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15). Both cases stand only for 
the proposition that juvenile courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction and may only make dispositions which are specifically 
authorized by statute. That theory is not contrary to respondent's 
position in this case. The State does not suggest that a 
juvenile court can make a dis9osition which is not authorized 
by the Utah Juvenile Court Act. However, as has been previously 
discussed, all dispositional orders made by the court in this 
case ~ specifically authorized by that Act, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-3a-39. 
Appellant also contends that it was not within the 
Juvenile Court's power to recommend to the Youth Development 
Center that restitution be made a condition of his parole. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 15). It is interesting to note that it 
was appellant's counsel who suggested that very procedure to 
the court. (TR. 33). 
The juvenile courts~ authorized to make recommendations 
to probation or parole departments regarding the collection 
of restitution. Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-39(7), quoted 
supra, authorizes the court to order restitution. The section 
immediately following that paragraph, Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-3a-39(8), provides as follows: 
(8) The court may through its probation 
department encourage the development of 
employment or work programs, to enable 
children to fulfill their obligations under 
the preceding paragraph of this section, 
-9-
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and for other purposes when deemed desirable 
by the court. 
Thus, the Juvenile Court was authorized to make a 
recommendation to the Youth Development Center that payment of 
restitution be made a condition of appellant's parole. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's brief focuses prima~ily upon the question 
of the amount of restitution which was ordered by the Juvenile 
Court. Respondent does not contest the arguments raised in 
Points I and II of appellant's brief. 
However, respondent does disagree with appellant's 
contention that the Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction 
to conduct a restitution hearing and to order restitution for 
damage caused by the wrongful acts of the appellant. That issue 
has been discussed fully herein. The Juvenile Court Act clearly 
states and intends that the juvenile courts of this State shall 
have the authority and responsibility to order restitution in 
appropriate cases. The victim of appellant's acts in this 
instance has suffered a substantial financial loss. Restitution 
is certainly an appropriate remedy in this case. 
Respondent urges this court to find that the Juvenile 
Court does have continuing jurisdiction to order restitution 
and to remand this case to the Juvenile Court for findings and 
-10-
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an order for restitution in a proper amount. 
Dated this 23rd day of April, 1979. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
SHARON PEACOCK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed 2 true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, 
on this the;?~~~ day of April, 1979, to Jane A. Marquardt, Utah 
Legal Services, Attorney for Appellant, at 385 - 24th Street, 
Ogden, Utah, 84401. 
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